Social and Cognitive Diversity in Science: An Epistemic Assessment (1.9.2018-31.12.2022)

The Diversity project contributes to philosophy of science by answering three questions:

  1. What are the epistemic benefits of (a) social and (b) cognitive diversity in science?
  2. Under what circumstances does (a) social diversity give rise to cognitive diversity, and (b) social/cognitive diversity to epistemically valuable outcomes?
  3. How should scientific communities and institutions manage epistemic risks that may be caused by increased social and cognitive diversity?

The project contributes to three research programs in the social epistemology of scientific knowledge: modelling and simulation work targeting the division of cognitive labor; case studies on the diversity of social values; and case studies on the diversity of social locations. By bringing the three research programs into a dialogue, the project produces novel understanding of the epistemic benefits of cognitive and social diversity as well as of the strengths and weaknesses of methods used in social epistemology. Collaborators: Inkeri Koskinen, Jaakko Kuorikoski, Renne Pesonen, Samuli Reijula, Pasi Valtonen.

Selected publications

  • Koskinen, Inkeri, and Rolin, Kristina. 2022. Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate roles for values in transdisciplinary research. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 91: 191-198.
  • Koskinen, Inkeri, and Rolin, Kristina. 2021. Structural epistemic (in)justice in global contexts. In Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science, eds. David Ludwig, Inkeri Koskinen, Zinhle Mncube, Luana Poliseli, Luis Reyes-Galindo. New York and London: Routledge, 115-125.
  • Koskinen, Inkeri, and Rolin, Kristina. 2019. Scientific/intellectual movements remedying epistemic injustice: The case of indigenous studies. Philosophy of Science 86 (5): 1052-1063.
  • Rolin, Kristina. 2019. The epistemic significance of diversity. In The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology, eds. Miranda Fricker, Peter J. Graham, David Henderson, and Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen. New York and London: Routledge, 158-166.

Political Philosophy of Scientific Knowledge (1.9.2015-31.8.2018)

Philosophers working on social epistemology draw on a variety of conceptual and theoretical resources. To a large extent political philosophy remains an unexplored terrain when philosophers develop a normative theory of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge. This project aims to fill this lacuna in scholarship by exploring the ways in which political philosophy can be applied in social epistemology. Whereas “Political Philosophy of Scientific Knowledge” is often understood to refer to debates concerning the role of scientific knowledge and experts in society as well as the role of lay citizens in scientific inquiry, this project extends the scope to include other topics in social epistemology, such as (i) scientific/intellectual movements and feminist standpoint theory; (ii) the epistemic benefits of diversity; (iii) scientific imperialism and epistemic injustice; (iv) the role of values in science and social responsibility; and (v) the distribution of epistemic responsibilities within and across scientific communities. While the relevance of John Stuart Mill’s, John Dewey’s and Karl Popper’s political philosophy to social epistemology is widely acknowledged, I pursue a novel approach to political philosophy of scientific knowledge. I argue that cosmopolitan political philosophy can be used to defend epistemic cosmopolitanism, the view that scientists have epistemic responsibilities not only towards their fellow scientists with whom they share a discipline or a specialty, but also towards stakeholders. I argue also that epistemic responsibilities need to be distributed in order for scientists to be able to carry them out.

Selected publications

  • Rolin, Kristina. 2021. Objectivity, trust and social responsibility. Synthese 199: 513-533.
  • Rolin, Kristina. 2020. Epistemic responsibility and relativism. In Social Epistemology and Relativism, eds. Natalie A. Ashton, Martin Kusch, Robin McKenna, and Katharina A. Sodoma. New York and Oxon: Routledge, 143-157.
  • Rolin, Kristina. 2017. Scientific community: A moral dimension. Social Epistemology 31 (5): 468-483.
  • Rolin, Kristina. 2017. Scientific dissent and a fair distribution of epistemic responsibility. Public Affairs Quarterly 31 (3): 209-230.
  • Rolin, Kristina. 2017. Can social diversity be best incorporated into science by adopting the social value management ideal? In Current Controversies in Values and Science, eds. Kevin C. Elliott and Daniel Steel. New York and London: Routledge, 113-129.
  • Rolin, Kristina. 2016. Values, standpoints, and scientific/intellectual movements. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56: 11-19.
  • Rolin, Kristina. 2016. Values in the social sciences: The case of feminist research. In Meta-Philosophical Reflection on Feminist Philosophies of Science, eds. Maria Cristina Amoretti and Nicla Vassallo. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, Vol. 317. Dordrecht: Springer, 133-150.
  • Rolin, Kristina. 2015. Economics imperialism and epistemic cosmopolitanism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (4): 413-429.